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STUDENT CASE COMMENTARY
POST-CONVICTION ACCESS TO A STATE'S FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE FOR PROBATIVE TESTING:
NOT A FREESTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. 2308
(2009).
Dorothea Thompson'
I.

Summary

In DistrictAttorney's Office v. Osborne, the United
States Supreme Court addressed the central issue of
whether Respondent William Osborne should have a
"freestanding and far-reaching constitutional right of
access" to the State's deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA")2
evidence for the purpose of post-conviction relief.
Osborne asserted this constitutional right of access under
the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 3 rather
than proceeding through a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. 4 The United States District Court for the
1

J.D., pending 2012, Univ. of Tennessee; M.A., English, Pennsylvania

State Univ.; Ph.D., Molecular Biology, Ohio State Univ. Prior to
attending law school, Dr. Thompson was an Assistant Professor of
Microbiology at Purdue Univ. and a research scientist.
2 District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2312 (2009)
(5-4 decision) (Alito, J., concurring) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
3 This federal statute allows any United States citizen or "other person
within the jurisdiction thereof' to pursue a civil action for the
"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
4 Habeas corpus is a writ through which a person can petition for relief
from unlawful custody. A federal court will not grant a writ of habeas
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District of Alaska initially dismissed the respondent's
claims, holding that an application for habeas corpus
constituted the proper mechanism for applicants attempting
to invalidate their criminal conviction. In its decision to
reverse, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Osborne was procedurally warranted
in invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the specific
circumstances of his case.5 On remand, the district court
granted Osborne summary judgment, stating that the
respondent had "a very limited constitutional right" to6
access the State's forensic DNA evidence for new testing.
The district court based its decision on three factors: (1)
the unavailability of the more precise technique of shorttandem-repeat ("STR") DNA analysis at the time of
Osborne's criminal trial; (2) the low cost to the State of
permitting such testing; and (3) the likelihood that the
analysis would be material to
results from such an
7
Osborne's conviction.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the
precedent established under Brady v. Maryland8 of a
prosecutor's pretrial duty to disclose material exculpatory
evidence also extended to the "government's duty to
disclose (or the defendant's right of access) to post-

corpus to a state prisoner "unless it appears that (A) the applicant has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i)
there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii)
circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the applicant." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(l)(A)-(B)(ii) (2000).
5 Osborne v. District Attorney's Office, 423 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir.
2005).
6 Osborne v. District Attorney's Office, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1081
(D. Alaska 2006).
7 Id. at 1081-82.
8 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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conviction proceedings." 9 Granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court ultimately reversed this decision, holding that
Osborne had no freestanding substantive right under the
Due Process Clause' ° to obtain post-conviction access to
the State's biological evidence for DNA testing. A
dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens argued that principles
of fundamental fairness and justice dictate that convicted
persons such as Osborne should have a limited federal right
to potentially dispositive DNA evidence, and that such a
right would serve as a necessary and appropriate safeguard
against a State's arbitrary refusal to permit post-conviction
access.II
II.

Background

Osborne, who is an African-American male, and
another man were convicted by an Alaska state jury of
sexual assault and other crimes, which were perpetrated
against a female prostitute in March 1993.12 At the time of
Osborne's trial, polymerase chain reaction ("PCR")-based
DQ Alpha testing and the more discriminating restrictionfragment-length-polymorphism ("RFLP") DNA testing
were typically employed for forensic DNA testing. 13 In the
instant case, the State performed DQ Alpha testing on
semen found in a condom at the crime scene, and the
results matched Osborne's genotypic profile, which is
found in approximately 16% of the black population. 4 The
DNA results conclusively excluded the victim and two
9 District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2315 (2009)

(citing Osborne v. District Attorney's Office, 521 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th
Cir. 2008)) (emphasis in original).
1o U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11 Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2335.
12 Id. at 2313.
"3 Id. at 2314.
14 Id. at 2313.
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additional suspects in the crime.' 5 Osborne's defense
attorney stated that RFLP DNA testing was not performed
for tactical reasons.' 6 Other incriminating evidence against
Osborne existed and most notably 7 included his
identification by the victim as her attacker.'
After failing to get his conviction vacated or his
sentence mitigated at the appeal stage, Osborne then sought
post-conviction relief in the Alaska state court.1 8 At the
time of the Supreme Court's decision in this case, forty-six
states, in addition to the District of Columbia and the
Federal government, had enacted statutory laws directly
addressing post-conviction access to DNA evidence for
probative testing.' 9 However, Alaska only had a general
post-conviction relief statute, Alaska Statutes section
12.72.010 (2008), which the petitioner could invoke if
"there exist[ed] evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard by the court, that require[d] vacation of
the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice., 20 To
ensure further protections of a prisoner's due process
rights, the Alaska Court of Appeals, through judicial
decision, invokes a three-pronged test to determine the
prisoner's right to DNA testing under the State
21
Osborne stepped outside the procedural
Constitution.
15 Id.

Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2314.
17 Id. at2313.
16

'8

Id. at2314.
Id. at 2316.
I9

Id. at 2317 (citing Alaska's general post-conviction relief provision
?rovided in ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.010(4) (2008)).
To be entitled to post-conviction DNA testing, a defendant must
show that "(1) that the conviction rested primarily on eyewitness
identification evidence, (2) that there was a demonstrable doubt
concerning the defendant's identification as the perpetrator, and (3) that
scientific testing would likely be conclusive on this issue." Id. at 231718 (quoting Osborne v. State, 110 P.3d 986, 995 (Alaska Ct. App.
2005)).

20

4
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framework of the state criminal justice system and filed his
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,22 thus raising federal
constitutional questions with respect to post-conviction
access to DNA evidence. This action ultimately required
resolution by the Supreme Court.
III.

Court's Conclusions and Rationale

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether § 1983 was the proper statutory vehicle for
asserting Osborne's claim and whether Osborne was
entitled by right under the Due Process Clause to access the
State's evidence for DNA testing after criminal
conviction. 23 Chief Justice Roberts, who delivered the
majority opinion of the Court, dismissed the first issue for
resolution. 24 The Court assumed that the Alaska Court of
Appeals was correct in its conclusion that the applicable
law does not bar Osborne's § 1983 claim because
permitting Osborne access to the DNA evidence that he
seeks would not automatically result in the invalidity of his
conviction and his release from custody.25
After declining to resolve the procedural question, the
Court turned next to the substantive issue of whether state
prisoners have a cognizable constitutional right to access
forensic DNA evidence. 6 Acknowledging that Osborne
has "a liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with
new evidence under state law," the Court proceeded by
examining "this asserted liberty interest to determine what
process (if any) is due.",27 In Brady, the Court held that a
prosecutor has a due process duty to disclose any
22

Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2318.

23

Id. at 2316.
Id. at 2319.

24

25 Id.
26
27

Id. at 2319-23.
Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2319.

5
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exculpatory evidence to the defendant prior to the trial
proceedings.28 Distinguishing Osborne from Brady, Chief
Justice Roberts stated that the Court of Appeals "went too
far" in extrapolating pre-conviction due process rights to
safeguard Osborne's post-conviction liberty interest.
The presumption of innocence is removed when a
defendant is convicted of a crime through a fair trial
process.30 The Court concluded that a valid conviction
creates "only a limited interest in post-conviction relief.",3 1
Therefore, as Chief Justice Roberts reasoned, the State
justifiably has a degree of latitude in imposing procedural
requirements for obtaining post-conviction relief (for
example, that the DNA analytical technology requested was
not available at trial or that eyewitness identification
32
Chief
evidence constituted the basis for conviction).
Justice Roberts asserted the State's authority on such
matters by stating that the "federal courts may upset a
State's post-conviction relief procedures only if they are
fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive
In dicta, the Court concluded that
rights provided.
Alaska's procedures for post-conviction relief were
adequate on their face and the burden was on Osborne to
prove otherwise.3 4
Finally, the Court rejected Osborne's contention that
he has a freestanding constitutional right to access DNA
evidence. As the Court stressed, decisions regarding postconviction rights of access to a State's genetic evidence are
best left in the hands of the state courts and legislatures:
"The elected governments of the States are actively
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2319.
30 Id. at 2320 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993)).
31 Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2320.
32 Id. at 2318, 2320-21.
33Id. at 2320 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 2321.
28
29
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confronting the challenges DNA technology poses to our
criminal justice systems and our traditional notions of
finality .... To suddenly constitutionalize this area would

to be a prompt and considered
short-circuit what looks
35
legislative response.,
In concurrence, Justice Alito raised two additional
and independent reasons for why the respondent's
constitutional claim should fail. 36 First, an application for a
writ of habeas corpus, not § 1983, is the proper legal
mechanism by which a state convict should aver a federal
constitutional right to access DNA evidence for discovery
testing. Insuch a case, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) requires
the applicant to have "exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State," 37 which Osborne had not done.
Second, Justice Alito concluded that, regardless of the
exhaustion provision in § 2254, Osborne's claim can be
rejected on the merits based on § 2254(b)(2), because "a
defendant who declines the opportunity to perform DNA
right
testing at trial for tactical reasons has no constitutional
38
to perform such testing after conviction."
In dissent, Justice Stevens (joined in part by Justice
Souter and fully by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) argued
that Osborne has a constitutional right to obtain postconviction access to physical evidence for DNA testing,
which Justice Stevens considers as dispositive. 39 Stategoverned procedures for post-conviction relief must
comport with due process principles in order to provide
those persons petitioning for such relief with "fair
opportunity to assert their state-created rights." 40 Justice
Stevens directly questioned the adequacy of Alaska
35

Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2322.

Id. at 2324.
" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000).
36

38
39
40

Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2324.

Id. at 2331, 2333.
Id. at 2332.
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Statutes section 12.72.010(4) in providing procedural
protections to state prisoners seeking access to DNA
evidence for exculpatory testing. 41 According to Justice
Stevens, Alaska's refusal to allow Osborne access to the
State's DNA evidence constituted an arbitrary state
government action. 42 Arguing primarily from the principle
of fundamental fairness, Justice Stevens reasoned that the
fact that most states sanction a "post-conviction right to
DNA evidence makes it more, not less, appropriate to
recognize a limited federal right to such evidence in cases
where litigants are unfairly barred from obtaining relief in
state court.

IV.

43

Analysis

The Court narrowly interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause within the context of
post-conviction access to the State's forensic DNA
evidence. The Court analyzed the question at issue from a
traditional and originalist perspective, properly restricting
post-conviction access to a state-created entitlement, which
has both statutory and judicially afforded protections. Two
arguments are posited in support of this decision. First, the
appellate court's attempt to analogize the precedent
established in Brady to the post-conviction context is
invalid. 44 Second, the state government and courts, not the
federal judiciary, are more adequately equipped to address
the evolving issues created by the application of modem
DNA technology to post-conviction relief in the criminal
justice system.45 Ultimately, the Court's decision preserves
the states' sovereignty in this area of law and will reduce
41
42

43

ld. at 2334.
Id. at 2336.
Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2335.

44 id. at 2320.
41 Id. at 2323.
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the stream of non-meritorious litigation emanating from the
state prisons.
From a substantive viewpoint, the Court correctly
rejected the premise that a defendant's due process rights to
pretrial disclosure of exculpatory evidence logically
extends ipsofacto to a convicted person's right of access to
the State's DNA evidence. While the Court stated that the
due process protections afforded to defendants before a
final judgment are not (and should not) be the same as for
individuals convicted at a fair trial, it recognized the need
for corrective measures in certain instances where the
incriminating evidence is weak and relies largely on
eyewitness identification. Such redress, however, is not
precluded by the lack of a freestanding constitutional right
to post-conviction DNA testing; such relief is simply
limited in a post-conviction context.
In the instant case, Alaska provided both statutory and
judicial procedures for accessing post-conviction relief,
including providing a substantive right to those inmates
seeking to obtain DNA evidence for testing purposes. 46 At
the crux of the disagreement between the majority and the
dissent is that these state-created rights are not released
without condition of a "sufficiently compelling showing of
new evidence that establishes [the convicted person's]
innocence." 47 Policy concerns of judicial economy and
efficient administration dictate the necessity for placement
of such state limitations on an inmate's access to postconviction relief. To constitutionalize post-conviction
access to DNA evidence would engender an unmanageable
influx of litigation in this area, eventually leading to an
erosion of notions of finality in the criminal justice system.

46

Id. at 2317-18.

47

Id. at 2320.
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V.

Conclusion
In District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, the United

States Supreme Court took a crucial step in defining the
boundaries of substantive due process rights within the
context of post-conviction relief. The Court held that a
state prisoner is not entitled to a freestanding constitutional
right to access the State's DNA evidence for exculpatory
testing purposes. While the Court's decision appears to
foreclose the vindication of wrongfully convicted
individuals, state legislatures and courts have provided
adequate procedural remedies, which permit postconviction relief in meritorious cases. In the instant case,
the Court saw no compelling reason to interfere with a
State's post-conviction relief procedures in light of the
respondent's failure to demonstrate such state law remedies
as insufficient.

10

